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1 Introduction
For most of the world wealth is positively associated with longevity (Preston, 1975) and
negatively associated with religiosity (Barro andMcCleary, 2003). However, not all countries
conform with the overall pattern. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the United States presents a
very visible exception. If wealth is measured by real per capita GDP, longevity is measured
by average life expectancy at birth, and religiosity is measured by belief in an afterlife, then
by these measures the US is very wealthy but also very religious compared to its OECD
peers, wealthy and religious but not especially long-lived. While some aspects in Figures
1 and 2 have been explained by economists and sociologists, no satisfactory explanation
exists for the general patterns and the United States exception in each of the Figures and
no explanation exists at all that connects the two Figures.1 We fill this gap by developing a
simple life cycle model with endogenous longevity and endogenous religious beliefs or faith.
At its core this paper asks: what are the economic forces that drive secularization and
longevity? The answer is not at all evident, because as Iannacone (1998) argues previous
work on the socioeconomics of religion has left open the question of religious belief formation.
For instance, theories following Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) and Iannacone (1990) emphasize
the demand for religion by individuals who base their choices on the perceived returns to
religion which depend on a combination of earthly and after-life benefits. These approaches
have generally maintained that religious activity depends on exogenous lifetimes while down-
playing the role of afterlife benefits. But it seems plausible that religious activity alters the
returns to longevity and religious beliefs, just as longevity or beliefs alter the returns to reli-
gious activity. Other theories emphasizing the supply of religion by religious organizations
have focussed on the forces that influence the market structure for religious firms. While
these supply-side approaches can explain why the United States differs from other countries
in terms of religious activity (Stark and Iannacone, 1994), they only indirectly address Figure
1 because they also take belief formation as given. Furthermore, the supply-side theories
have little to say about Figure 2 because they are silent about connections to other dimen-
sions of individuals’ life cycle choices such as their life expectancy. Some of the determinants
1The general pattern in Figure 1 has been taken as evidence for the controversial secularization hypothesis
that relisiosity wanes with economic development. The hypothesis is often attributed to Weber (1904),
though there are other secularization theories that do not imply a negative association between religiosity
and development (Gorski, 2000). The secularization hypothesis is controversial, in part because there are a
number of instances, such as the United States exception, where the hypothesis fails.
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Figure 1: Belief in Heaven and Per Capita GDP in 1990
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Figure 2: Life Expectancy at Birth and Per Capita GDP in 1990
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Notes: Countries in sample: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
Source: Barro and McCleary (2003) and OECD. The solid line is a log-linear trend
that has been fitted to the data and plotted for illustrative purposes.
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of life expectancies have been explored in the longevity production approach by Philipson
and Becker (1998). Their model implies that life expectancies vary positively with wealth,
which leaves open why the United States has a lower life expectancy than its OECD peers
despite higher wealth. Their model also leaves unexplored the connection between religiosity
and longevity, despite some controversial research (Sloan, Bagiella, and Powell, 1999) on the
links between religion and health.
In developing our framework, we start with the perspective that on a very simple level
many religions emphasize good works on earth and certitude about an afterlife. Good works
can involve many things such as the giving of time and money, but at its simplest it involves
resources given to a religious organization. Religious organizations use these resources
to produce credence goods (Iannacone, 1998) by promoting certainty of beliefs about an
uncertain and unverifiable afterlife. We model the role of beliefs in a simple equilibrium
model with individuals who maximize their lifetime utility, where lifespans are endogenous
along the lines of Philipson and Becker (1998), and where the afterlife payoff is determined by
a lifetime of good works but there is uncertainty about the afterlife. Religious organizations
are assumed to control the technology that produces faith. Faith is modeled simply as greater
certainty about the afterlife payoff so that religious firms can be thought of as controlling
probability production functions in the spirit of Montgomery (1996). Because faith alters
the expected returns to longevity, religion will influence the trade-offs faced by individuals
when choosing how long to live, how much to consume, and how much to donate for good
works. Also, because faith is produced from donations to religious firms, we emphasize the
competitiveness of the market for religious inputs rather than the competitiveness of the
market for religious outputs as is usual in the economics of religion literature.
Our framework implies that market competition by religious organizations strengthens
faith and religious beliefs by increasing fundraising and donations, but also causes longevity
to fall and consumption to either rise or fall. While the effect of competition on religiosity
is well understood, we also draw out the implications of how competition affects other di-
mensions of individuals’ life cycle choices. Less understood is how economic development
and the higher wealth that accompanies economic development affect religiosity. We make
the striking finding that wealth may cause donations and faith to either rise or fall while
increasing consumption and longevity. The intuition for the effects of development or com-
petition depends on the balance of wealth and substitution effects that are associated with
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development or competition and on the behavior of two relative prices: the relative price of
longevity and the relative price of donations or fundraising. We show that our model can
explain the general patterns in Figures 1 and 2 and the United States exception as a result
of economic development and market competition. We also investigate the role of intrinsic
religiosity and technological progress in the production of religion.
2 The Individual’s Decision Problem
Individuals are assumed to maximize a conventional lifetime utility function to which we add
an explicit afterlife payoff. If we only consider stationary outcomes, then expected lifetime
utility is
Tu(c) + πa(T ) (1)
where T is the endogenous length of life, c is annual consumption, and u(.) is the value
placed on consumption. We assume the typical regularity conditions for u(.) that guarantee
an interior solution for consumption. We abstract from discounting and an uncertain length
of life, but, as we indicate below, the model can easily be generalized to Yaari’s (1965) model
with discounting and mortality risk with essentially the same results.
The afterlife is uncertain and described by a finite payoff a(T ) if heaven occurs and
0 otherwise and by a probability π that heaven will occur.2 For the time being we will
assume that this probability is exogenous to the individual, but this assumption is key and
the subject of the analysis. More on π will be said in the next section where we describe
religious organizations. Under our notation, faith is measured on a continuous scale with
an atheist having π = 0 and a true believer having π = 1. We assume that a(T ) increases
with T or that the heavenly payoff increases with the length of time good works have been
performed. In other words, we assume a Dantean paradise. Though we assume a′(T ) > 0,
because the afterlife is fundamentally non-verifiable, we have no strong position on the sign
of a′′(T ) and for the most part we will simply assume a′′(T ) ≤ 0. Normally, an economist
would simply take it on faith that there are diminishing returns, which though plausible for
most earthly relationships, may not be plausible for the transcendental. One might also
consider the sign of a′′(T ) an empirical matter, but direct tests for an afterlife have yet to
2We do not assume there is a hell, for simplicity. Barro and McCleary (2003) show that the belief in
heaven and hell may each have distinct implications for economic behavior.
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be devised. However, as our comparative statics will show, the assumption of a′′(T ) ≤ 0 is
consistent with what we know about earthly behavior.
Individuals maximize expected utility subject to a wealth constraint
T (c+ τ ) = Z (2)
where Z is lifetime wealth and τ is annual contributions to the religion, where these donations
can be either involuntary or voluntary in which case they are interpreted as good works.3
We note that the length of life is determined by its value in lifetime utility and constrained by
lifetime wealth. We do not explicitly consider the connection between health and longevity.
Philipson and Becker (1998) introduce health and longevity production by assuming a convex
cost of longevityM(T ) that is subtracted from wealth. We do not follow this path here, but
instead focus on the effect of having religious beliefs on an afterlife. The main difference
between the two approaches is that religious beliefs affect the marginal rate of substitution
between longevity and consumption, whereas longevity production affects the relative price
between longevity and consumption. Thus, both approaches change the quality-of-life and
quantity-of-life trade-off in much the same way, though with a difference of interpretation.
Optimizing individuals set the marginal benefit of living longer equal to the marginal cost
of living longer and they do the same for annual consumption (and also donations when these
are endogenous). Combining the optimality conditions for consumption and longevity, we
obtain a tangency condition that equates the marginal rate of substitution between longevity
and consumption and the price of longevity relative to consumption
u(c) + πa′(T )
u′(c)
= c+ τ (3)
The relative price of longevity is endogenous and a positive function of annual outlays c+ τ ,
because the wealth constraint is a non-linear function of annual outlays and longevity. The
optimality condition reflects a tangency of convex indifference curves in (c, T ) space with a
wealth constraint that is also convex (for related work see Edlefson, 1981). We put aside
the issue of multiple solutions, and only consider the case of a unique interior solution. We
3Our results carry over to the more general framework of Yaari (1965) with discounting and mortality
risk. In this framework, expected lifetime utility is A (T )u(c) + π (τ) a(T ) and the wealth constraint is
A (T ) (c + τ) = Z, where A(T ) is the annuity value of a security paying one dollar every year until T , or
A(T ) ≡
∫ T
0 e
−(ρ+δ)tdt with ρ the constant rate of time preference and δ the constant hazard rate of death.
The essential difference with the present framework is that A(T ) replaces T and that one needs to account
for the fact that A(T ) is not linear T in the comparative static formulas below.
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also note that an increase in faith π increases the subjective valuation of longevity relative
to consumption. When faced with such a belief shock, individuals seek to reestablish the
optimality condition by balancing increases in consumption that raise the relative price of
longevity with decreases in consumption that lower the subjective valuation of longevity.
3 Religious Organizations and the Market Structure
To close the model we assume a particularly simple form for the religious organizations and
the market conditions they operate under. More general forms are certainly possible, but
may obscure the central point of this analysis. We assume first, that religious organizations
act as perfect competitive firms in the market for donations and then compare the outcome
with the outcome when religious firms have monopsony power and when there is free entry
by non-profit religious firms. Initially, we assume that religious donations τ are extracted
involuntarily from individuals, but later we will let individuals choose how much τ to supply
and firms choose how much τ to demand.
Religious organizations choose τ to maximize production of religious certainty less the
cost of acquiring funds τ . The unit cost of acquiring funds is assumed to be a convex
function θ (τ) that can be interpreted as the cost of fundraising per unit of τ . Production
of faith is assumed to take the following simple form π (τ ) with π ∈ [0, 1] and π′ > 0 > π′′ or
diminishing marginal output because faith is a credence good and credibility is hard fought.
In other words, we assume that π (.) has the shape of a cumulative distribution function for
a continuous random variable. Thus, the religious organization chooses τ to maximize
π (τ )− θ (τ) τ (4)
The details of the maximization depend critically on the competitive landscape. When
the religious organization raises funds in a competitive manner, θ is treated as exogenous by
the organization and we have
π′ (τ ) = θX∗ where X∗ = 1
or that funds received by the organization vary inversely with unit fundraising costs. In-
tuitively, higher unit costs require higher marginal productivity which occurs when funds
decline. Fewer funds in turn imply that less faith is produced for the individual.
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For comparison, suppose the religious organization has monopsony power with control
over its fundraising costs. This assumption is related to the observation that in many
countries with state religions, religious organizations act monopolistically (Iannacone, 1998).
If we assume convex costs θ (τ ) with θ′ (τ) > 0 and θ′′ (τ)  0, then profit maximization
implies
π′ (τ ) = θXm where Xm = 1 + εθ ≡ 1 +
τθ′ (τ )
θ (τ)
> 1
SinceXm > X∗ and π′′ (τ) < 0 as well as θ′ (τ ) > 0, we have τm < τ ∗. In other words, greater
competitiveness requires greater fundraising effort in order to satisfy the firm’s optimality
condition and more fundraising leads to more donations τ and stronger beliefs π.
We, also, consider the case of non-profit religions under free entry, because many countries
give religious charitable organizations tax exemptions and non-profit status. Free entry
implies that individual profits are driven down to zero with θ again treated as exogenous, or
π (τ )
τ
= θ
which can be rewritten as
π′ (τ ) = θXn where Xn = επ ≡
τπ′ (τ)
π (τ)
< 1
Since X∗ > Xn, we have τn > τ∗. Thus, free entry and the non-profit condition imply more
fundraising and stronger beliefs than under pure competition. This situation may as a short
hand be sometimes referred to as “more competitive” than perfect competition in the sense
of greater fundraising effort.
We summarize the firm optimality and entry conditions with
π′ (τ ) = θ (τ)Xi (5)
where
Xm = 1 + εθ > X
∗ = 1 > Xn = επ
Because Xm > X∗ > Xn, we have τn > τ ∗ > τm as well as π (τn) > π (τ ∗) > π (τm) .
In other words, a more “competitive” landscape for religions leads to more fundraising and
ultimately to stronger beliefs.4
4For simplicity, we assume that the profits of religious organizations stay with the organization and are
not funneled back to households. We also assume for simplicity that the elasticities εθ and επ are constant.
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We can also show that technological progress is in many ways similar to a more com-
petitive market structure. Technological progress can be in the form of a more efficient
belief production technology (higher marginal product π′ for all τ) or lower fundraising costs
(lower unit cost θ for all τ) by which we mean lower communication and distribution costs.
In either case, progress leads to higher τ to satisfy (5) and thus to stronger beliefs and more
religious certainty. This might explain the puzzle that a wealthy country like the United
States is so religious. Not only is religion very competitive in the United States (and afforded
non-profit status), but communication costs are also low. Both factors encourage faith and
more religious certainty under our assumptions. The model also implies that secularism in
other wealthy countries may be explained by lack of competition among religions or relatively
high communication costs either for technological reasons or market interventions (perhaps
through state control of communication outlets). The competition interpretation would be
in line with the traditional supply-side or markets theory of religion originally put forth by
Adam Smith (see Iannacone, 1998), whereas the technological progress interpretation could
be thought of as a Schumpeterian view for the diffusion of religion.
4 Comparative Statics with Involuntary Donations
Before we allow a market for donations, we analyze the model’s response when involuntary
donations can be extracted. Involuntary donations can be thought of as state-assisted
religious fundraising when a portion of government tax revenues is channeled to religious
organizations. Involuntary donations may also be extracted directly by religions. However,
religious organizations differ from the government in the sense that the amount of resources
extracted is dictated by the market structure that the religious organizations are assumed to
operate under. In other words, lowerX i or greater competitiveness requires more fundraising
effort to satisfy the firm optimality and entry condition (5). Since donations are involuntary
and beliefs are produced by fiat, this in essence is like a model of persuasive advertising where
religious firms affect beliefs directly without explicit consideration for individuals’ willingness
to contribute funds to religion and the costs of fundraising.
To find the effect of religious competition, we totally differentiate the wealth and opti-
mality conditions (2) and (3). The determinant of the resulting system of equations is
∆I = (c+ τ )
c+ τ
c
σu +
πa′
u′
σa
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where ∆I ≥ 0 assuming σa ≡
−a′′T
a′
≥ 0 and σu ≡
−u′′T
u′
≥ 0. To understand the effect of
religion and religious market organization we proceed by first examining the effect of wealth,
followed by the effect of religion, and then the effect of involuntary donations.
Our analysis implies that changes in wealth tend to increase longevity and consumption:
∆I
dT
dZ
=
c+ τ
c
σu ≥ 0 and ∆I
dc
dZ
=
πa′
u′
σa ≥ 0
Both of our comparative static results are consistent with evidence that consumption and
longevity are normal goods when there are diminishing returns of the afterlife payoff. Be-
cause consumption generally increases with wealth, and given that σu ≥ 0, we must have
a′′ < 0 or σa > 0. We note that if good works are interpreted as private consumption c,
then we have a stark and distinctly selfish or Calvinistic interpretation of good works.
Religion has a pure substitution effect on longevity and consumption, because greater
religiosity as measured by a higher π for a given τ increases the subjective valuation of
longevity while leaving the relative price of longevity unchanged. Because the subjective
valuation of longevity increases, religious certainty makes longevity appear relatively cheaper:
∆I
dT
dπ
=
a′
u′
T > 0 and ∆I
dc
dπ
= − (c+ τ)
a′
u′
< 0
Thus, greater faith by itself tends to increase longevity but decrease consumption. This is
consistent with findings that religiosity is associated with better health and longer lifespans.
Faith reduces consumption because religious faith increases the payoff to longevity and thus
increases the net marginal benefit of living longer. Thus, religious certainty acts like an
exogenous reduction in the relative price of longevity and causes a substitution effect that
induces individuals to substitute consumption for longevity.
Involuntary donations have both wealth and substitution effects on longevity and con-
sumption. Higher forced donations have a negative wealth effect but also strengthen re-
ligious belief. More certainty in the afterlife acts like a decrease in the relative price of
longevity in comparison with the subjective valuation of longevity and thus tends to raise
life expectancies. These influences are summarized in
∆I
dT
dτ
= −T
[
c+ τ
c
σu +
(
1−
πa′
Tu′
εa
)]
and ∆I
dc
dτ
=
−πa′
u′
σa+(c+ τ )
(
1−
πa′
Tu′
εa
)
Intuitively, an increase in τ causes a negative wealth effect that tends to reduce both longevity
and consumption. The substitution effect depends on whether τ increases the subjective
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valuation of longevity by more or less than it increases the relative price of longevity. If
1 > π
′a
u′T
εa, then the increase in the relative price of longevity dominates.
5 Under these
circumstances, the net substitution effect is to decrease longevity and increase consumption,
which implies that the wealth effect on longevity is reinforced, while the wealth effect on
consumption is offset. Consumption may either increase or decrease depending on the
relative strength of the wealth and substitution effects.
5 A Market for Voluntary Donations
In this section we allow individuals to make voluntary donations of τ towards a purely private
good that is used by religious organizations to produce faith or greater certitude about an
afterlife. Voluntary donations can also be interpreted as contributing to religious capital as
in Iannacone (1990). Under this interpretation, religious capital is the accumulated stock
of lifetime sacrifices through donations, or Tτ . We continue with the assumption that the
components of this stock have differential effects on the expected afterlife payoff with T
affecting a(T ) and τ affecting π(τ ), but one can easily imagine other possibilities.
When the donation of the individual τ is endogenous, we add another optimality condition
to the earlier condition (3). Individuals choose donations by equating the marginal benefit of
donations to the marginal cost. Rearranging this condition produces an optimality condition
that equates the marginal rate of substitution of donations relative to consumption and the
relative price of donations:
π′ (τ ) a(T )
u′(c)
= T (6)
where the relative price of donations equals T because of the non-linear wealth constraint.
To complete this model we impose equilibrium in the voluntary contributions market.
That is, we equate the firm’s demand for funds to the individuals’ supply of funds by equating
the π′ (τ ) perceived by individuals in (6) to the π′ (τ ) desired by firms in (5). Thus, we have
θ (τ)X ia(T )
u′(c)
= T (7)
where i indexes the market structure that religious firms are operating under with a decrease
in X i denoting a rise in competitiveness. The primary effect of increased competitiveness
5We note that in the next section where τ is endogenous, we will have an additional optimality condition
that equates the marginal benefit of donations and the marginal cost of donations, or π′a = Tu′. Thus,
assuming 1 > π
′a
u′T
εa amounts to assuming that donations are too high relative to their optimum.
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is to increase the production of religious certainty π and thus increase the demand for
donations by religious organizations. Increased competitiveness also reduces the subjective
valuation of donations relative to consumption and thus, acts like an increase in the relative
price of donations with a substitution effect of falling donations and rising consumption.
The substitution effect on donations tempers the primary effect of increased competition
on donations. Because increased competitiveness leads to an increase in religious certainty
π, the subjective valuation of longevity relative to consumption increases in (3) which acts
like a reduction in the relative price of longevity. Thus, competitiveness tends to reduce
consumption and raise longevity (as before when donations were involuntary).
To analyze the comparative static properties of our model, we totally differentiate equa-
tions (2), (3), and (7) and solve for the response of the three endogenous variables c, π, and
T . The determinant of the resulting system of equations is
∆V = (c+ τ )
T
c
σu
{
c+ τ
τ
εθ + 2 (1− εa)
}
+ T
{
σa
εa
επ
(
εθ −
τ
c
σu
)
+ (εa − 1)
2
}
where ∆V > 0 assuming that the cost of producing faith is sufficiently convex or εθ ≥
τ
c
σu
where εθ ≡
θ
′
τ
θ
. Assuming εθ ≥
τ
c
σu is not as strong an assumption as it may appear at
first glance, because consumption usually is far greater than donations and thus τ
c
is fairly
small. To understand the effect of religion and religious market organization we proceed as
before and first examine wealth effects, followed by the effect of religion and then the effect
of a more competitive religious market structure.
We find that wealth effects are positive for consumption and longevity without special
restrictions. One can easily show that voluntary donations are also a normal good when (6)
is used instead of (7). By using (7), we capture the equilibrium response of donations to
changes in wealth rather than the individual’s supply response. The equilibrium response
of donations to wealth is ambiguous without special restrictions. In particular, we find that
∆V
dT
dZ
=
(
T
c
σu
)[
c + τ
τ
εθ + (1− εa)
]
> 0
∆V
dc
dZ
=
εa
επ
σaεθ + (1− εa)
2
> 0
∆V
dτ
dZ
=
σu
c
[
−
εaσa
επ
τ + (1− εa) (c+ τ )
]
≷ 0
Consumption and longevity respond positively to wealth, but the net effect on donations
is ambiguous. The ambiguity arises because higher longevity raises the relative price of
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donations relative to consumption in (7) causing a substitution effect that reinforces the
wealth effect for consumption and offsets the wealth effect for donations. When the induced
substitution effect dominates the original wealth effect, donations fall when wealth rises,
which leads to a fall in religiosity.
In other words, wealth has a secularization effect when the following secularization con-
dition holds:
1− εa
εa
1
σa
<
1
επ
τ
c+ τ
If the secularization condition is violated, greater wealth produces greater religiosity. Whether
or not wealth leads to secularization depends on jointly on the outlay share of donations τ
c+τ
,
the curvature of the belief technology, and the curvature of the afterlife payoff function. In
short, the outcome is determined jointly by demand and supply side parameters.
The secularization condition is more likely when επ is low or when εa is high and σa
is low, because the outlay share of donations τ
c+τ
tends to be quite small under normal
conditions. Because the belief production function π () has the shape of a conventional
cumulative distribution function with a flat range for high values of τ , we conclude that
επ is low for sufficiently large values of τ . In other words, secularization is more likely to
accompany greater wealth when donations and religiosity are high initially, while religiosity
is more likely in initially relatively secular societies with low levels of donations.6 Because
the afterlife payoff function a () is concave, the secularization condition is more likely when
the afterlife payoff is responsive to earthly lifespans and when life expectancies are low. For
example, if a () has a constant elasticity form, then σa = 1 − εa so that the secularization
condition is more likely when εa is high and a () is not too concave. More generally, one can
show that εa falls with T because the elasticity of εa equals 1− εa − σa ≤ 0.
The secularization condition illustrates the force of wealth and substitution effects on
donations and religiosity and can explain differences across countries in religious beliefs as a
demand-side phenomenon. In particular, it guarantees that the wealth effects on donations
of a change in wealth outweighs the induced substitution effect from a change in wealth.
Violation of the secularization condition results in a positive net effect on donations. Thus,
6The shape of the belief function means that competition causes a regression to the mean in religiosity.
Other shapes for π () might cause religiosity to diverge when competition increases. For instance, if the
cumulative distribution functions π () exhibit flat ranges for low values of τ (something we have ruled out
at the onset), then wealth increases cause secular societies to become more secular when the secularization
condition holds or more religious when the secularization condition is violated.
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development and higher wealth may be associated with either higher or lower religiosity
depending on whether the condition is satisfied or violated. However, if we consider Figures
1 and 2, we see that this demand-side explanation is insufficient for explaining the associated
cross-country variation in longevity. Specifically, the model implies a positive relationship
between longevity and wealth, which generally holds true except for the United States.
If we continue with our earlier assumption that 0 ≤ τ
c
σu ≤ εθ, then we find that an
exogenous increase in religiosity, which we denote intrinsic religiosity, has a positive effect
on longevity and donations but a negative effect on consumption:
∆V
dT
dπ
=
a′T 2
u′
[εθ
τ
−
σu
c
]
> 0
∆V
dc
dπ
=
−a′T
u′
[
(
c+ τ
τ
εθ + (1− εa)
]
< 0
∆V
dτ
dπ
=
a′T
u′
[
(
c+ τ
c
σu + (1− εa)
]
> 0
Religious certainty has a positive effect on longevity because it raises the subjective valuation
of longevity relative to consumption. This is perceived by individuals as equivalent to a
reduction in the relative price of longevity and so there is a positive substitution effect on
longevity and a negative substitution effect on consumption. Lower consumption and higher
longevity increase the subjective valuation of donations in (7), with higher longevity also
raising the relative price of donations. The combined effect of greater religious production
is that donations rise.7 Though the United States has higher faith and perhaps donations
than other OECD countries, the model suggests that this may not be due to higher intrinsic
religiosity. According to our model, higher intrinsic religiosity would also be associated with
lower consumption and higher longevity, something that appears to be counterfactual when
comparing the United States to its OECD peers.
Finally, the effects of competition in the donations market (where a decrease in X means
more competition) on longevity, consumption, and donations are
∆V
dT
dX
=
T 2
X
[
(1− εa) +
c+ τ
c
σu
]
> 0
7Religion would have an ambiguous effect on longevity without our assumption that 0 ≤ τ
c
σu ≤ εθ .
The ambiguity arises because the relative price of longevity depends positively on the sum of consumption
and donations. Our assumption guarantees that the reduction in consumption from an increase in faith
outweighs the increase in donations, so that the price of longevity falls and longevity rises. The assumption
is likely to hold in practise because τ
c
usually is small.
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∆V
dc
dX
=
−T
X
[
(1− εa) (c+ τ)−
εaσa
επ
τ
]
≷ 0
∆V
dτ
dX
=
−T
X
[
(c+ τ)2
c
σu +
εa
επ
τσa
]
< 0
Thus, competitiveness will have opposite effects on longevity and charitable giving and an
uncertain effect on consumption. An increase in competitiveness increases the demand for
donations by religious organizations. The increase in donations in turn increases the relative
price of longevity causing a negative substitution effect for longevity. So an increase in com-
petition undoubtedly reduces longevity and increases donations, which is consistent with our
previous result that an increase in involuntary contributions τ reduces longevity. The effect
on consumption is ambiguous because it depends on the balance of two substitution effects.
First, lower longevity reduces the price of donations relative to consumption which causes a
positive substitution effect for donations and a negative substitution effect for consumption.
Second, higher donations increase the price of longevity relative to consumption which causes
a positive substitution effect on consumption. Interestingly, the net effect on consumption
of the two substitution effects depends on whether or not the secularization condition holds.
When the secularization condition holds, increased competitiveness in the market for reli-
gious donations causes consumption to rise by virtue of a dominating substitution effect
from a higher relative price of longevity.
While differences in the competitiveness of religious markets can explain the observed
variation in religiosity and longevity across countries, they are insufficient to explain the
observed variation in consumption unless the secularization condition is violated for the
United States. To see this, note that religious markets are highly competitive in the United
States and more or less uncompetitive in the rest of the OECD. Also, note that the United
States has higher consumption than its OECD peers. For countries where the secularization
condition holds, we find that relatively lower competitiveness results in lower religiosity,
higher longevity, and higher consumption. Thus, if the secularization condition holds for
all, the model predicts greater religiosity and lower longevity for the United States, which
agrees with Figures 1 and 2, but also counterfactually predicts lower consumption in the
United States. Alternatively, if the secularization condition is violated in the United States,
we find that greater competitiveness can now also result in relatively higher consumption in
the United States. While having the secularization condition violated by the United States
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is not the only way to explain the Figures, it may provide a more parsimonious explanation
of the joint effects of competition and development than if the condition is not violated. If
the secularization condition is not violated by the United States, one would have to argue
that the competition effect dominates the development effect for religiosity and longevity in
order to explain Figures 1 and 2, and that the development effect dominates for consumption
in order to explain the relatively higher consumption in the United States.
How do our comparative statics results compare with Figures 1 and 2? Figure 1 shows
that religious beliefs and wealth as approximated by per capita GDP are for the most part
negatively related, with the United States providing an visible exception. Figure 2 shows
that longevity and wealth are positively related, with the United States a small exception.
Our comparative statics results suggest that both Figures can be explained as a combination
of wealth and competition shocks. Wealth shocks produce a positive longevity response and
if the secularization condition is violated a positive effect on donations. Increased religious
competition, by contrast, has a negative longevity effect and a positive donations effect.
Thus, to explain the United States exception, one could use our model to argue that the
secularization condition is violated by the United States so that competition and development
forces reinforce each other to produce religiosity in the United States and secularization in
the rest of the OECD. For longevity, the model suggests that the negative competition
effect on longevity in the United States offsets the positive wealth effect on longevity to
create the unexceptional life expectancies in the United States as compared to its OECD
peers. Assuming that the secularization condition is violated by the United States would
also allow the possibility for comparatively high United States consumption, rather than the
low consumption that would be predicted by the model if the secularization condition were
not violated.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis has in a very simple model explained the religiosity and comparatively low life
expectancy evidenced by the United States as compared to other wealthy nations. Specif-
ically, we explain Figures 1 and 2 as a result of economic development and religious com-
petition. By itself, development and the increased wealth that accompanies development
produce a wealth effect and an induced substitution effect by raising the relative price of
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donations. Because the wealth and substitution effects offset one another for religious do-
nations and religiosity, we show that secularization occurs when the wealth effect dominates,
while religiosity occurs when the substitution effect dominates. We provide a secularization
condition that shows under what conditions the wealth effect dominates the substitution ef-
fect from development. If the condition is violated by the United States but not by its OECD
peers, then it is possible to explain cross-country variation in religiosity and consumption
as a result of wealth differences. However, because wealth tends to increase longevity, the
unexceptional longevity in the United States is not explained as a result of development. On
the other hand, competition in religious markets creates two substitution effects by raising
the relative price of longevity and reducing that of donations. Thus, competition by itself
can explain cross-country variation in religiosity and longevity, but not consumption unless
the secularization condition is violated by the United States. Combining the two forces
and assuming that the secularization condition is violated for the United States implies high
religiosity in the United States, unexceptional life expectancies in the United States because
the competition effect offsets a positive wealth effect, and high consumption in the United
States because the wealth effect may now be reinforced by the competition effect.
Our results come out of a simple life cycle model with endogenous longevity where reli-
gious firms influence religious beliefs using donations as an input. The key mechanism is
that religious market competition for inputs and economic development affect the returns
to longevity and the costs of fundraising and ultimately an individual’s degree of certainty
with respect to the afterlife, which we have termed faith though faith is arguably much more
complex than this reductio. Our analysis highlights the wealth and substitution effects that
come about from competition and development and ultimately drive religious donations and
religiosity. In order to focus on the life cycle aspects of religion, we have simplified the
analysis along many dimensions that could be fruitfully relaxed. For instance, we have
kept capital and wealth exogenous, but it would be of interest to see them determined in a
fully specified dynamic general equilibrium model. This would allow us to assess to what
extent the dynamic path of religiosity and capital agree with Weber’s (1904) hypothesis that
economic development and religious beliefs are fundamentally intertwined.
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